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Walker: Workers' Compensation: Florida's Resistance to Nonstatutory Limit

CASE COMMENT
WORKERS' COMPENSATION:
FLORIDA'S RESISTANCE TO NONSTATUTORY LIMITS
TO THE EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL DOCTRINE***
Scott v. Otis Elevator Co., 572 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1990)
Petitioner brought suit against respondent, alleging that respondent wrongfully discharged him because he filed a workers' compensation claim,2 and that respondent's retaliatory termination of his employment violated Florida Statutes section 440.205. 3 The jury found for
petitioner, and respondent appealed. 4 Petitioner cross appealed, 5 alleging that the trial court improperly refused to instruct the jury on

*Editor's Note: This case comment received the George W. Milam Outstanding Case Comment
Award for Spring 1991.
**Author's Note: Dedicated to my parents, Larry J. and Dorothy E. Walker; my sister,
Elizabeth; and my brother, Larry. Special thanks to Rodney Smith, Esq. and my advisor, Robin
Rosenberg.
1. Scott v. Otis Elevator Co., 572 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1990).
2. Id. at 902. Respondent officially specified customer complaints, absenteeism, and tardiness as reasons for dismissing petitioner. Otis Elevator Co. v. Scott, 503 So. 2d 941, 942 (4th
D.C.A. 1987), quashed, 524 So. 2d 642 (Fla. 1988). In addition, respondent advised petitioner,
unofficially, that he was terminated because of an assault incident. Id. In contrast, petitioner
contends that he was terminated because respondent believed he would file for workers' compensation benefits. Id. at 941.
3. FLA. STAT. § 440.205 (1989). In 1979, the Florida Legislature enacted Florida Statutes
§ 440.205, which provides: "No employer shall discharge, threaten to discharge, intimidate, or
coerce any employee by reason of such employee's valid claim for compensation or attempt to
claim compensation under the Workers' Compensation Law." Workers' Compensation Act, ch.
79-40, § 17, 1979 Fla. Laws 244. The wording of the statute remains unchanged. FLA. STAT.
§ 440.205 (1989).
4. Scott, 572 So. 2d at 902. The jury awarded petitioner "$100,000 in past lost wages and
benefits and $200,000 for future lost wages and benefits." Otis, 503 So. 2d at 941.
5. Scott, 572 So. 2d at 903. The Fourth District Court of Appeal initially reversed based
on the running of the two-year statute of limitations governing actions to recover wages or
overtime. Otis, 503 So. 2d at 941. The Supreme Court of Florida quashed that decision and
held that petitioner's claim advanced a statutory cause of action and was therefore governed
by FLA. STAT. § 95.11(3)(f) (1979), which provides that an action founded on statutory liability
must be filed within four years. Scott v. Otis Elevator Co., 524 So. 2d 642 (Fla. 1988). The
court remanded to the district court for consideration of the remaining issues on appeal. Id. at
643. The instant case arose out of review of the district court's hearing on remand. Scott, 572
So. 2d at 903.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1991

1

Florida Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 3 [1991], Art. 8
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

damages for emotional distress.6 The Fourth District Court of Appeal
held that the trial court's refusal was not error because the petitioner
did not plead the separate tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress.7 On certification," the Florida Supreme Court ordered a new
trial, disapproved the Fourth District Court of Appeal's rationale, and
HELD, that an employer who discharges an employee, violating
Florida Statutes section 440.205, commits an intentional tort and is
consequently liable for damages for emotional distressY
Traditionally, if an employment contract does not specify duration,
either party may terminate the contract at will.10 The at-will doctrine
allows the termination of employment relations without cause.I' Hence,
at-will employees serve at the whim of employers.12 The harshness of
the employment-at-will doctrine caused many jurisdictions to soften
the rule by creating judicial exceptions.' 3 However, some states steadfastly refuse to apply nonstatutory exceptions to the employment-atwill doctrine.

14

6. See Otis Elevator Co. v. Scott, 551 So. 2d 489, 490 (4th D.C.A. 1989), affd, 572 So. 2d
902 (Fla. 1990).
7. Id. In addition, the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that the trial court erred in
allowing an award for lost future wages where the petitioner failed to attempt to mitigate
damages and made no showing that reinstatement was impossible. Id.
8. Scott, 572 So. 2d at 902. See also FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(4) (granting review of
"any decision of a district court of appeal that passes upon a question certified by it to be of
great public importance ..
"). The Fourth District Court of Appeal certified the following as
a question of great public importance: "ARE DAMAGES FOR EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
AVAILABLE TO THE PLAINTIFF IN AN ACTION FOR WRONGFUL DISCHARGE PURSUANT TO SECTION 440.205, FLORIDA STATUTES?" Scott, 572 So. 2d at 902.
9. Scott, 572 So. 2d at 903.
10. See generally M. PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1-3 (1988) (outlining
the evolution of the American view of the employment-at-will doctrine). The American position
on the employment-at-will doctrine departed markedly from the traditional English common law
which mandated the continuance of employment relations for one year except where dismissal
was grounded on good cause. Id. at 1-2. In contrast, an increasingly inflexible American rule
emerged in which "employers possessed an absolute right to discharge any employee not protected by an express contract." Id. at 2.
11. Id.
12. See id.
13. M. PLAYER, supra note 10, at 3-5. A number of theories limit an employer's discretion
to terminate at-will employees. Id. For example, most jurisdictions have asserted a check on
employer discretion where termination contravenes important public policies. Id. Alternatively,
courts have circumscribed an employer's absolute discretion by recognizing that an employment
arrangement is necessarily contractual in nature and is therefore governed by an implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing. Id.
14. Id. at 2-5.
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Florida courts consistently decline to alter the employment-at-will6
doctrine.' 5 For example, in DeMarco v. Publix Super Markets, Inc., 17
the court refused to adopt a public policy exception to the doctrine. 8
In DeMarco, an employee sued for wrongful employment termination.'
The employee alleged that he was terminated because he refused to

discontinue a law suit on behalf of his daughter. 19 The employee contended that his employer forced him to choose between continued
ememployment and his constitutional right to litigate a claim. 20 The
21

ployer moved to dismiss the action for failure to state a claim.

The trial court dismissed the complaint, and the district court of
appeal affirmed. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the district
court's holding and adopted its rationale.2 The district court of appeal

15. See, e.g., Wynne v. Ludman Corp., 79 So. 2d 690, 691 (Fla. 1955) (in the absence of
a definite period of employment, trial court correctly entered summary judgment for employer
who terminated at-will employee); Gibbs v. H.J. Heinz Co., 536 So. 2d 370, 371 (Fla. 5th D.C.A.
1988) (in the absence of a definite term of employment in an employment contract, employee
is terminable at will); De Felice v. Moss Mfg., Inc., 461 So. 2d 209, 210 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1984)
(in the absence of a definite term of employment, employee is terminable at will); Muller v.
Stromberg Carlson Corp., 427 So. 2d 266, 268-70 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1983) (in the absence of an
employment contract, a promise regarding permanency of employment does not negate employer's right to terminate at will); Servamerica, Inc. v. Rolfe, 318 So. 2d 178, 180 (Fla. 1st D.C.A.
1975) (in the absence of an express agreement, employee is terminable at will, even where an
employee left a management position based on an offer for a supervisory position).
16. 384 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 1980).
17. Id. at 1254.
18. Id. at 1253.
19. DeMarco v. Publix Super Mkts., Inc., 360 So. 2d 134, 135 (3d D.C.A. 1978), affd, 384
So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 1980). Employee's minor daughter suffered permanent injuries while shopping
in one of employer's stores. Id. The employee declined a $200 settlement offer at which time
employer informed employee that if the claim was not withdrawn, his employment would be
terminated. Id. Employee filed suit, and employer terminated his employment. Id.
20. Id. at 136. The employee argued that the employer violated his constitutional right of
access to the courts guaranteed by article I, § 21 of the Florida Constitution. Id. The Florida
Supreme Court rejected employee's assertion that he had been denied access to the courts
noting that 'DeMarco's suit on behalf of the daughter was pending at the time of the district
court opinion. Therefore, neither he in his representative capacity nor the daughter as beneficiary
has been denied access to the courts to vindicate the claim for her injuries." DeMarco, 384 So.
2d at 1254 n.1. See also FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21 (providing that every person shall have access
to the courts in order to redress any injury). Contra Scholtes v. Signal Delivery Serv., Inc.,
548 F. Supp. 487, 492-94 (W.D. Ark. 1982) (employee may assert a public policy exception to
at-will employment where employer sought to force employee to forego a legal right).
21. DeMarco, 360 So. 2d at 136.
22. DeMarco, 384 So. 2d at 1254.
23. Id. The Florida Supreme Court's perfunctory treatment of the case reflects the rigidity
with which it applied the employment-at-will doctrine. Thus, if an employee's term of employment
was indefinite, no action for wrongful termination would lie no matter how egregious the wrong.
See DeMarco, 360 So. 2d at 136.
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reasoned that the employment term was indefinite, and the employer
could terminate the relationship at will.A Therefore, the employee's
claim that the employer violated article I, section 21 of the Florida
Constitution by thwarting his access to the courts, did not state a
cause of action.? Thus, the DeMarco court declined to recognize a
public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine even when
an employer discharges an employee for pursuing a constitutional

right.

26

Florida employers are also free to discharge an employee for pursuing a statutory right.2 7 In Segal v. Arrow Industries Corp., an
employee argued that his employer wrongfully terminated him because
he filed a workers' compensation claim. 29 The court found no Florida
authority to support an action for retaliatory discharge. 30 The employee
asserted that a cause of action should exist because wrongful termination offends public policy31 The court declined to limit the at-will
doctrine and instead reaffirmed DeMarco. The court held that although a statute entitles employees to file compensation claims, employees hired for an indefinite term may be terminated for filing these
claims.- Thus, Florida courts consistently refused to grant employees
a cause of action for retaliatory discharge.34

24. DeMarco, 360 So. 2d at 136.
25. Id.
26. DeMarco, 384 So. 2d at [253-54.
27. Segal v. Arrow Indus. Corp., 364 So. 2d 89, 90 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1978).
28. 364 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1978).
29. Id. at 89-90.
30. Id. at 90.
31. Id. Employee offered two nonbinding cases in an effort to encourage the court to
recognize a public policy exception: Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d
425 (1973) and Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976). In Sventko,
the court suggested that:
[A]n employer at will may not suddenly terminate the employment of persons
because of their sex, race, or religion. Likewise, the better view is that an employer
at will is not free to discharge an employee when the reason for the discharge is
an intention on the part of the employer to contravene the public policy of this state.
Sventko, 69 Mich. App. at 646, 245 N.W.2d at 153.
32. Segal, 364 So. 2d at 90.
33. See id. Contra M. PLAYER, supra note 10, at 5. Florida courts' refusal to recognize
an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine, when an employee is terminated for filing a
workers' compensation claim, essentially emasculates the workers' compensation system. Player
explains that, "as the system of compensation depends upon employees initiating claims, reprisals
for the filing of such claims would undercut the compensation scheme and improperly forces
employee to choose between a statutory right and their jobs." Id.
34. Segal, 364 So. 2d at 90.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol43/iss3/8

4

Walker: Workers' Compensation: Florida's Resistance to Nonstatutory Limit
CASE COMMENT

In 1979, the Florida Legislature enacted Florida Statutes section
440.205 prohibiting an employer from discharging, threatening to discharge, intimidating, or coercing an employee because the employee
filed a workers' compensation claim.3 The statute does not expressly
create a cause of action or provide a remedy, 36 however, the Florida
Legislature did demonstrate its intent to preclude retaliatory discharge
of employees who file workers' compensation claims.3 7
The Florida Supreme Court interpreted section 440.205 in Smith
v. Piezo Technology & Professional Administrators.3s In Smith, an
employee alleged he was wrongftlly terminated because he filed a
workers' compensation claim.39 The employee sought relief pursuant
to section 440.205.40 The district court of appeal held that section
440.205 creates a cause of action for wrongful discharge. 41 The Florida
Supreme Court affirmed. 42
The supreme court in Smith recognized a section 440.205 cause of
action even though the legislature failed to designate a proper forum
or remedy. 43 The court noted that Florida does not follow other jurisdictions which create a public policy exception to the at-will doctrine
by recognizing a common law tort for retaliatory discharge." However,
since the legislature expressed its intent by enacting a statute which
precludes retaliatory discharge for filing a workers' compensation46
claim, 45 the supreme court limited the employment-at-will doctrine.

35. Workers' Compensation Act, ch. 79-40, § 17, 1979 Fla. Laws 244 (current version at
FLA. STAT. § 440.205 (1989)). See generally Cooper & Westberry, Handling Retaliatory Discharge Cases Under the Workers' Compensation Act, 58 FLA. B.J. 253 (1984) (outlining the

development of Florida law regarding retaliatory discharge prior to the statute's enactment).
36. See FLA. STAT. § 440.205 (1989).
37. Smith v. Piezo Tech. & Prof. Admins., 427 So. 2d 182, 184 (Fla. 1983). Contra Piezo
Tech. & Prof. Admins., Inc. v. Smith, 413 So. 2d 121, 123-26 (1st D.C.A. 1982) (Ervin, J.,
dissenting) (asserting that the legislative purpose of § 440.205 is not clear absent specific provisions for sanctions and jurisdiction), quashed, Dean v. Publix Super Mkts., Inc., 438 So. 2d 1
(Fla. 1983).
38. 427 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 1983).
39. Id. at 183.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 184 n.1.
44. Id. at 184.
45. Id.
46. Id. Florida's development of a retaliatory discharge exception parallels that of Alabama.
See Meeks v. Opp Cotton Mills, Inc., 459 So. 2d 814, 814 (Ala. 1984) (holding that in the absence
of a statutory limit, an employee is terminable at will even in retaliation for filing a workers'
compensation claim), superceded by statute as stated in McClain v. Birmingham Coca Cola
Bottling Co., 578 So. 2d 1299 (Ala. 1991); see also Caraway v. Franklin Ferguson Mfg. Co.,
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Moreover, the court expressly disapproved earlier opinions conflicting
47
with its holding.
In the instant case, the Florida Supreme Court augmented the
Smith holding by defining the remedies under section 440.205.8 In an
earlier opinion concerning the instant case, 49 the supreme court stated
that wrongful termination is an intentional deprivation. 5° In addition,
the court reaffirmed the Smith holding that section 440.205 creates a
"distinct limited statutory cause of action ...for retaliatory discharge
in the area of workers['] compensation." 5' 1 However, the earlier opinion
did not discuss damages.52
The instant court did address the issue of damages,- and held that
an employer who violates section 440.205 contravenes public policy
and is liable for an intentional tort.- The court noted that jurisdictions
recognizing claims for retaliatory discharge typically allow recovery
for emotional distress.- Employers attempt to circumvent the legislative workers' compensation scheme by using retaliatory discharge.
Therefore, the wrongful discharge is intentional and should be characterized as an intentional tort.5 7 Accordingly, the court held that tort
damages are the appropriate remedy.s
507 So. 2d 925, 926 (Ala. 1987) holding that when legislature statutorily expresses an intent
to preclude retaliatory discharge for filing a workers' compensation claim, a claim under that
statute is actionable even where statute is silent as to relief).
47. Smith, 427 So. 2d at 184 n.2. The court offered an example of a case impacted by their
decision: Publix Super Mkts., Inc. v. Dean, 416 So. 2d 12 (3d D.C.A. 1982) (declining to follow
sister court in Smith and finding that § 440.205 does not create a cause of action for wrongful
termination), rev'd Dean v. Publix Super Mkts., Inc., 438 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1983). Smith, 427 So.
2d at 184 n.2.
48. Scott, 572 So. 2d at 903.
49. Scott, 524 So. 2d at 642; see also supra note 5 (outlining the procedural history of the
instant case).
50. Scott, 524 So. 2d at 643.
51. Id.
52. See id.
53. Scott, 572 So. 2d at 903.
54. Id. The court additionally held that an employee need not disprove reinstatement as a
viable alternative to recover lost future wages. Id. Conversely, the United States Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals predicates recovery of future wages on the showing of impossibility
of reinstatement. Castle v. Sangamo Weston, Inc., 837 F.2d 1550, 1562 (11th Cir. 1988).
55. Scott, 572 So. 2d at 903 (discussing Cagle v. Burns & Roe, Inc., 106 Wash. 2d 911,
915-16, 726 P.2d 434, 436 (1986) (entitling an employee discharged in violation of public policy
for reporting procedural violations to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to tort damages
including damages for emotional distress)).
56. See id. at 903 (quoting Cagle, 106 Wash. 2d at 915-16, 726 P.2d at 436).
57. Id.
58. Id. One court has held that a claim for emotional distress in the absence of physical
trauma provides great latitude in the assessment of damages. Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 169
W. Va. 673, 690, 289 S.E.2d 692, 701 (1982).
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Sharply dissenting, Justice McDonald argued that while the majority's position logically extended Smith, emotional distress damages
should be denied 9 Justice McDonald contended that employment recontractual
lations are contractual in nature6 ° Therefore, he argued,
6
1
termination.
wrongful
remedy
damages appropriately
The instant decision reflects the Florida Supreme Court's reticence
to usurp actions which it implicitly stated are properly within the
legislature's purview.2 Although the instant court utilized precedent

from other jurisdictions in fashioning damages,6 the court declined to
recognize a judicially imposed public policy exception to the at-will

doctrine." In this respect, the instant decision is consistent with previous Florida cases.6 Based on the express legislative intent of section
440.205, the instant court reaffirmed a narrow exception to the employment-at-will doctrine.r, Hence, the instant case illustrates what the

Florida Supreme Court arguably perceives as a nonactivist position
regarding its role in limiting the at-will doctrine.-

The instant decision does not necessarily reflect judicial intent to
ignore the problems facing at-will employees.6s On the contrary, by
allowing tort damages for section 440.205 violations, 69 the instant court

recognized the legislature's attempt to curb unbridled employers' discretion.70

In his dissent, Justice McDonald argued that contractual damages

are a more appropriate remedy. 7'1 Contractual damages, however, are

59. Scott, 572 So. 2d at 904 (McDonald, J., dissenting).
60. Id. (McDonald, J., dissenting).
61. Id. (McDonald, J., dissenting). Justice McDonald suggested that 'ina case involving
the discharge of an employee under contract for a specific period, the actual measure of damages
is the amount of compensation agreed upon for the remainder of the period, less the amount
that the employee earned or might have earned." Id. (emphasis added) (citing 22 AM. JUR. 2d
Damages §§ 31-35 (1988)). However, Justice McDonald did not address the situation of an
employee at-will with no "specific period." Therefore, at best, Justice McDonald's formula is
inapplicable to the instant case. At worst, the formula provides no damages to the at-will
employee who has been wrongfully discharged.
62. See Scott, 572 So. 2d at 903-04; see also supra note 13 and accompanying text.
63. See Scott, 572 So. 2d at 903.
64. See id.
65. See supra notes 15-17, 28-32 and accompanying text.
66. See Scott, 572 So. 2d at 903.
67. See id.
68. See supra notes 16-26 and accompanying text.
69. Scott, 572 So. 2d at 903.
70. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
71. Scott, 572 So. 2d at 904 (McDonald, J., dissenting).
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inconsistent with the majority's rationale in reaffirming Smith.- Smith
recognized a cause of action to remedy wrongful termination of employ-

ees filing workers' compensation claims.7 Justice McDonald's proposed
remedy would defeat that objective because contractual damages evade
calculation when employment is at will.74 Since employers hire at-will

employees for an indefinite term7 5 it would be impossible to calculate

contractual damages of a wrongfully terminated employee.76 As a result, section 440.205 would be rendered ineffective.
The instant court held that employers violating section 440.205 are
liable for tort damages. 7 Thus, employees potentially may receive
dramatic awards.- s Hence, by choosing this remedy, the instant court
implicitly sought to dissuade employers from violating section
440.205. 79 The instant decision comports with the legislative purpose
of section 440.205 as defined in Smith,s o and reflects a judicial willingness to breathe life into a legislative scheme designed to protect employees."'
In addition to defining the remedial scope of section 440.205, the
instant court clarified the parameters of Smith.8 In Smith, the Florida
Supreme Court recognized a limited statutory action against employers
who wrongfully terminate an employee for pursuing a workers' compensation claim. Moreover, that court expressly disapproved opinions
conflicting with the instant decision. 4 Hence, if Segal was decided
today, the employee would have a cause of action. In contrast, De-

72. See supra text accompanying notes 48-58.
73. See Smith, 427 So. 2d at 184.
74. See supra note 61.
75. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
76. See Scott, 572 So. 2d at. 904 (McDonald, J., dissenting); see supra note 61.
77. Scott, 572 So. 2d at 903.
78. See Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 169 W. Va. 673, 690, 289 S.E.2d 692, 701 (1982)
(discussing the open-endedness of awards for emotional distress in the absence of physical injury).
79. See Scott, 572 So. 2d at 903 ("Section 440.205 reflects the public policy that an employee
shall not be discharged for filing or threatening to file a workers' compensation claim.").
80. See Smith, 427 So. 2d at 184 (finding that § 440.205 creates a statutory cause of action
because "it must be assumed" that the provision is intended to have a useful purpose).
81. See Scott, 572 So. 2d at. 903.
82. See id. (approving the Smith decision which held that § 440.205 creates a statutory
cause of action and clarifying that a violation of the statute constitutes an unintentional tort).
83. Smith, 427 So. 2d at 184.
84. Id. at 184 n.2.
85. See Segal, 364 So. 2d at 90 (holding that employee at will may be fired for filing
compensation claims).
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Marco does not fall within the scope of the Smith decision. 6 Thus, in
Florida, an employer may no longer discharge an employee seeking
recovery pursuant to the workers' compensation statutes.8 But, an
employer may still terminate an employee who files a lawful suit. 8 In
Florida, an employee's access to the courts rests not on the lawfulness
of the claim but the type of claim. 9 This inconsistency will plague
Florida law so long as an employee's umbrella of protection extends
only to the pursuit of workers' compensation claims, but not to other
lawful claims.9
The instant court's decision creates an illogical and unfair inconsistency in Florida law. 91 The Florida Supreme Court cloaks its decision
in the mantle of judicial deference to proper legislative authority.9
Judicial nonactivism, however, smacks of activism. By refusing to
create a judicially recognized exception to the at-will doctrine, 93 the
supreme court perpetuates an inequitable system which essentially
leaves employees subject to the caprice of employers.9 The instant
position advances an inherently employer-biased
court's intransigent
95
social policy.
However, the instant decision does not represent unqualified hostility to employees. By applying tort damages, the instant court gives
section 440.205 force.9 The instant court delays softening the at-will
doctrine to await a legislative signalY Yet, unmistakably, the legislature has signaled.9 Broadly construed, section 440.205 repudiates unrestrained retaliatory discharge. The legislature has provided an im-

86. See DeMarco, 384 So. 2d at 1254 (holding that employer may fire employee-at-will for
pursuing constitutional right).
87. See Smith, 427 So. 2d at 184.
88. See, e.g., DeMarco, 384 So. 2d at 1254.
89. Compare FLA. STAT. § 440.205 (1989) (forbidding employer from terminating employeeat-will because employee filed workers' compensation claim) with DeMarco, 384 So. 2d at 1254
(allowing employer to terminate employee-at-will because employee filed lawful suit against
employer).
90. See Smith, 427 So. 2d at 185 (Overton, J., concurring) ('There is neither a logical nor
justifiable reason for this inconsistency to remain in our law.").
91. Id. (Overton, J., concurring).
92. See Scott, 572 So. 2d at 903.
93. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text and text accompanying notes 44-45.
94. See upra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
95. See supra text accompanying notes 9-11.
96. See supra text accompanying notes 48-58.
97. See Smith, 427 So. 2d at 184 (explaining that Florida does not recognize nonstatutory
exceptions to the at-will doctrine).
98. See id. (stating that the intent of the statute is to preclude retaliatory discharge).
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petus to the long delayed retreat from strict application of the harsh
employment at-will doctrine.- The Florida Supreme Court should pursue that legislative goal by judicially recognizing a common law tort
for retaliatory discharge. This solution would remedy both the inconsistency in Florida law and the inequities visited upon employees by
the strict application of the employment-at-will doctrine. 1Mark E. Walker

99. See id.
100. See id. at 185 (Overton, J., concurring).
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